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Abstract. The vector space model facilitates a very useful representation
of the strategic interaction in trade because it is possible to incorporate
both symmetric and asymmetric features of the players. This paper char-
acterizes the Nash solution of the non-cooperative international trade game
in the orthogonal vector space. We have used the standard properties of the
Nash solution to determine if the non-cooperative action-reaction trade pol-
icy space should be written in terms of 'import-import' or 'import-export'
quotas as strongest punishment. The trade policy space dened by 'import-
export' quotas is not a Nash solution of the non-cooperative game but an
improvement in the disagreement set. We show the positive correlation
between import and export quotas using data on trade relations between
EU-15, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria for wine sector during 1995-2005.
In our model the outcome of the non-cooperative trade is autarky. Retal-
iation is played when countries restrict their imports to one third of the
national optimum.
JEL Classication: C72, F14, F51
Keywords: disagreement point, quotas, non-cooperative game, Nash solu-
tion
1. Introduction
In this paper we explain EU-15 trade relations with the Central East Eu-
ropean Countries (CEEC's) employing the method of the reduction to the
absurd. We suppose that a small country market may be used as outlet for
dumping a large country's market surplus so that so that a trade policy space
dened with import quotas restricting exports is a retaliatory stance between
two countries of asymmetric market size. We prove the supposition wrong
building up a model that accounts for the asymmetry of the partners while en-
compassing both conict and cooperation features of the strategic interaction
in trade. Conict is reected in the level of retaliatory market access modeled
through the mean of both import and export quotas. Cooperation is induced
through political negotiations on the level of market access. In this way de-
ned trade relations t perfectly in the governmental welfare function dened
by Grossman&Helpman (1995)1 which minimized independently provides the
politically least acceptable import/export quotas in contrast with the common
welfare governmental function which provides the politically acceptable level
1The governmental welfare function is discussed in detail when we present the model.
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of import/export quotas that both governments would agree through nego-
tiations2. The outcome of the internal political negotiations on the level of
market access are in the parameter attached to the national welfare which is
higher the higher are the political pressures for exporting respectively more
protection is need it. In line with the previous studies as well as the prac-
tice of trade liberalization, we study the strategic interaction in trade between
CEEC-s and the European Union focusing on a single sector with the highest
conict potential. Three of the CEE countries and the European Union are
main wine producers in the world sharing high exporting potential while EU
is facing wine market surpluses administered even through distillation. Con-
fronted with such situation it might be argued that the CEEC's markets could
have been used as an outlet for European exports which coupled with a low
market access points a retaliatory type of trade relations on wine market.
We start the analysis considering that retaliation can be played with both
import and export quotas even if the outcome of the non cooperative game
is still controversial in the literature. Retaliation with both import and ex-
port quotas has been modeled by Towers (1974), Syropoulos, Dinopoulos and
Kreinin (1995), Noritsugu Nakanishi (1999) but retaliation is played with 'op-
timum quotas' which would maximize each country's welfare. Except Towers
(1974), autarky was not found to be the outcome of retaliatory game. Indeed
EU15-CEEC relations have not been autarkic suggesting that the hypotheth-
ical situation in the beginning might be wrong.
It was Noritsugu Nakanishi (1999) who suggested that the diversity of results
might be due to the Nash equilibrium concept so that our contribution to the
strand of research is to ensure that the retaliatory game is played starting out
from the conict point of the non-cooperative game in trade that is the point
where each government minimizes the governametal welfare individually. We
plot the disagreement point of the non-cooperative game within the topological
space representing international trade and we show that the retaliatory policy
space dened by 'import-export' quotas is not a Nash equilibrium therefore
not a solution of the retaliatory game but an improvement from the worse
outcome. Our result supports Milner's (1988) argument that highly exporting
rms are not likely to lobby for protection in fear of foreign retaliation even if
the sector's import penetration ratio is high. Using the linkage between export
dependence ratios, import penetration ratios and internal political pressures
in CEEC strategic trade relations with EU-15 for wine sector we show that
exports do not carry a retaliatory conict potential on the contrary, they are
a better outcome of the strategic interaction in trade.
The model is applied to the EU trade relations in wine sector with Romania,
Bulgaria and Hungary which best exemplies the evolution path from autarky,
retaliation and cooperation through both restrictive import quotas and highly
expansionist volumes of exports.
2The common welfare governmental function is provided by Grossman, M. Gene and Help-
man, Elhanan , Trade wars and trade talks, Journal of Political Economy, 103, 675-708,
(1995)
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In the next section we explicitly determine the Nash equilibrium of the
retaliatory game with both import and export quotas as well as market asym-
metries and we provide evidence that exports are an improvement from the
worse outcome of the non-cooperative game. In Section 3 we illustrate the
Nash behavior on trade relations between EU and CEEC's. Starting out from
retaliation we empirically show that negotiations have helped to increase the
market access and to avoid the conict possibly generated by a large dierence
in market potential. Conclusions about the model and further directions of
research are subject of the last section.
2. The Model
We model conict in trade relations in international political economy fash-
ion in a two countries two goods general equilibrium framework using a gov-
ernmental welfare function introduced by Grossman and Helpman (1995),
GC = CC + aCWC . Countries have similar political and economic struc-
ture. CC is the lobby campaign contribution for setting up a quota while aC is
the value that the government attach to the national welfare, WC . The lobby
contributions and the value of the governmental weight is higher in exporting
countries and lower in the importing ones. Governments count on rents and ex-
port licenses revenues in their welfare function. Each country exports one good
and imports the foreign substitute. Production and consumption frontiers are
continuous linear functions of price, YC = +pC , YC : R+ ! R and respec-
tively XC = A BpC , XC : R+ ! R while p
C = (p1; ::::; pj) is the price vector
for j = 1; ::::; n: The set of feasible consumption bundles XC of the country C
is the list
 
XC1 ; X
C
2 ; :::::; X
C
n

respectively YC =
 
Y C1 ; Y
C
2 ; :::::; Y
C
n

for pro-
duction, YCj ;X
C
j 2 Rn f0g andj = 1; ::::; n: We denote by E
C = YC   XC
one country's exports. According to the denition of the topological space
the additive inverse of EC must be included in T1: Let  EC be the addi-
tive inverse of EC so that IC =  EC = XC   YC denotes country C im-
ports. Thus the oer curve is allowed to bend back towards the axis represent-
ing imports so that Tower's restrictive assumption of elasticity of imports is
eliminated. International trade is characterized by the one dimensional space
T1 = fIC
IC = YC  XC ;YCj ;XCj 2 Rn f0gg so that geometrically the space
which contains one vector and its additive inverse is represented as follows,
Figure 1. International Trade Space
At this point note that the one dimensional international trade space T1
could be dened as either imports or exports. In line with the usual ap-
proach in the literature we model trade interaction in the orthogonal space
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TT? , T? is the orthogonal complement of T1: In order to distinguish
between the one dimensional space and its orthogonal complement we dene
T? = fEC
EC = YC  XC ;YCj ;XCj 2 Rn f0gg . T? being a subspace of R
any subspace properties must hold so that similar to Cowell(2004):
1. Autarky
f0g 2 T?
2. Asymmetries
 2 N;EC 2 T? implies EC = 
 
YC  XC

= YC   XC 2 T?
3. Aggregate oers
EC ; EC 2 T? implies EC + EC 2 T?
The second property of any linear transformation of exports included in
the international trade space ensures the possibility that both symmetric and
asymmetric countries are modeled. To infer this consider that each linear
transformation of one country's production and consumption functions from
Property 2 can be assigned to other countries to obtain a full range of countries
of higher market size as reected by  which is a measure of the dierence in
market size between the countries strategically interacting in trade.
The non-cooperative game is played in the orthogonal space TT? = 
IC ; EC)jIC?EC ; IC 2 T 1; EC 2 T? g so that T1 
 
T?
?
property of
the orthogonal space and at the same time the asymmetric structure of the
game is veried. The outcome of the non-cooperative game is the orthogonal
set DD?  TT? while D1 is the retaliatory disagreement set of a small
importing country and D? is the orthogonal retaliatory disagreement set of a
large exporting country.
We deneD1 = fdC 2 D1
dC = min
IC
GC ; GC = CC + aC
 
C + CSC +QC)g
andD? =

dC 2 D?
dC = min
EC
GC ; GC = CC + aC
 
C + CSC +QC)g; where
C are the producers prots, CSC the consumers surplus, QC are the gains
from the quota rents and import licenses calculated as the product between
the price dierential and the volume of trade.
3. Retaliatory disagreement point
The strategic interaction between two countries Home(H) and Foreign(F),
C 2 fH;Fg , is modeled in the spaceTT? =
 
IH ;EF )jIH?EF ; IHEF ; IH 2 T 1;EF 2 T? g
so that Home is small and Foreign is large. "Optimum quotas" are replaced by
the points where a quota would minimize each government's welfare function
called retaliatory disagreement point (RDP) so that,
Lemma 1. GC is convex and increasing in
 
dH ;dF

while
(RDP)
 
dH ;dF

= (1/3)
 
zHYH   t; 
 
zFYF + t

for (8) 2 N (1)
Proof. We determined the inuence of the trade policy choice on terms of trade
using imports and exports denitions as follows (for comparative purposes see
Bond and Park (2000)),
@pH

@IH =  1/(B + ); @pH

@EF =  1/ (B + );
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@pF

@EF = 1/ (B + ); @pF

@IH = 1/(B + ):
In the classic analyze of the social welfare by envelope theorem, Roy identity,
Bernheim and Whinston "truthfulness" property and setting the rst order
condition equal to 0 (see Cadot, Melo, Olarreaga (2002)): IH = (+1/3)

zHY H   t

;
EF = ( 1/3)

zFY F + t

for z = 1

aC ; t = (B + )
 
pF   pH


The retaliatory disagreement point
 
dH ;dF

is a Nash solution of the non-
cooperative game if it satises the standard Nash axioms: symmetry (SYM),
invariance (INV), independence of the irrelevant solutions (IIA) and Pareto
optimality (PAR) while it is necessary to establish if the disagreement points
are attained with import or export quotas.
(SYM) Since EF 2 T?; IH 6 EF implies that the strategic interaction space
T  T? includes trade solutions which are the results of the non-cooperative
trade interaction between:
a) Symmetric players if IH = EF when  = 1; YH = YF ; H = F ; pH =
pF : The welfare weight is equal aH = aF = a: Countries are of equal size when
 = 1 so that they produce a comparable level of production denoted by YH :
Equation (1) writes,
(RDP )
 
dH 0;dF 0

= (1/3)
 
zHYH ;   zHYH

(2)
Using the denition of the exports that was set up in the model,  dF 0 = IF :
The retaliatory game is played at the disagreement point dF 0 where Foreign
restricts Home's optimum exports to at most one third and less of the politi-
cally acceptable minimum internal production. Similar for Foreign's exports.
Retaliation starts when the politically optimum import quotas are the same for
both countries. Therefore, the retaliatory disagreement set of the symmetric
non-cooperative game writes,
DD? =
 
dH 0; dF 0
 dH 0 = IH ; dF 0 = IF 	 (3)
b) Asymmetric players if IH < EF when  2 [1;1) ; YH < YF ; H <
F ; pH < pF and aF 6= aH : Equation (1) writes,
(RDP )
 
dH 00;dF 00

= (1/3)
 
zHYH   t; 
 
zFYF + t

(4)
Foreign disagreement point is  dF 00 = IF so that retaliation is played with
an import quota. However a similar conclusion is not straightforward for Home.
Home's retaliatory point writes,
DD? =
8><
>:
 
dH 00; dF 00
 dH 00 = IH ; dF 00 = IF if zHYH > t
0 if zHYH = t 
 dH 00; dF 00
  dH 00 = EH ; dF 00 = IF if zHYH < t
(5)
In expression (5), asymmetry in the non-cooperative problem extends the
solutions set to the fourth quadrant of the orthogonal axes so that so that
Home could retaliate with either an import or an export quota against an
import quota set by Foreign.
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Proposition 1. Changing players identities changes the outcome of the game,
therefore imports and export quotas cannot be at the same time a Nash equi-
librium.
Proposition 1 implies that one of the outcomes of retaliation that we should
be concerned with is stability. At this point we have only one result which
is stable for further analysis of EU15-CEEC trade relations. A retaliatory
stance of a large exporting country is in fact a tight import quota. For the
small country, a higher market size of its trading partner enlarges the range
of policy options so that its retaliatory best response may be either an import
quota or a retaliatory increase in the volume of exports or both. Looking
up at the previous result through the lances of the Nash equilibrium, if each
government seeks individually an equilibrium in trade relations, the policy
choice that brings retaliation has to follow the usual Nash properties. From
all, asymmetries in the Nash equilibrium is the most worrying because when the
retaliatory game is played with asymmetric players it should not be expected
variations in the Nash equilibrium trade relations. Nash axioms imply that
each player should know when a trading partner policy option is retaliation
and which one is his best response to such situation so that proposition 1
implies that the standard symmetric property of the disagreement set is not
veried. We could anticipate that either the 'import-import' or the 'import-
export' retaliatory policy space is not a Nash solution of the game so that we
check invariance (INV) property of the Nash equilibrium solution.
(INV) The ane transformation of the symmetric disagreement points is
quite straightforward since the disagreement points of two symmetric countries 
dH 0;dF 0

= (1/3)
 
zHYH ;   zHYH

ts perfectly in the ane formmdC+
n for (8) m 2 R+; n 2 R: Suppose rst that the retaliatory policy space is
given by import quotas. By mean of transformation mdC + n = mzCYC  
mt + n; m 2 R+; n 2 R . Denoting  mt + n by r , mz
CYC + r varies
with mzC 2 R+; r 2 R;  2 N following any ane transformation of the type
mdC + n: If the retaliatory policy space is given by both import and export
quotas then mdC + n =  mzCYC   mt   n; m 2 R+; n 2 R: Denoting
 mt  n by r0;  mzCYC + r varies with  mzC =2 R+; r
0 2 R;  2 N: Export
quotas do not follow the ane transformations of the retaliatory point.
Proposition 2. The retaliatory policy space dened with 'import-export quo-
tas' is not a Nash equilibrium of the retaliatory game.
Indeed, invariance of the Nash solution is not veried if retaliation is played
by the small country with an increased volume of exports. A retaliatory policy
space dened with retaliatory exports against a large country's tight import
quota is not a Nash solution of the non-cooperative game and the hypothesis
presented in the beginning for EU15-CEEC relations was wrong (Q.E.D).
Further, in order to explain the result from Proposition 2 the next property
of the Nash solution helps us to sort out the relevant solution of the game
from the non-Nash solutions while delineating the retaliatory types of policy
opyions from the non-retaliatory ones.
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(IIA) We can dene now the disagreement set of the non-cooperative game
as the convex setD2 = D\D? of retaliatory points. The previous axioms have
already revealed a common point of the intersection set, namely the 'import-
import' choice of the retaliatory policy space so that any equilibrium solution
must satisfy the inequality zHYH < t . The intersection set of Nash solution
in both Home and Foreign country is the set of disagreement points,
D \D? =
 
dH 00; dF 00
 dH 00 = IH ; dF 00 = IF 	 (6)
The previous analysis yields the set of the irrelevant solutions of the non-
cooperative game is the retaliatory disagreement set, IRR = D2n
 
D \D?

:
(IRR)
 
1=3)(dH 00;dF 00

=
 
EH ; IF

(7)
Proposition 3. A trade policy space dened by import and retaliatory export
quotas is an irrelevant solution of the non-cooperative game, moreover it is an
improvement from the disagreement set.
The result can be justied and visually conrmed in the topological space
of the international trade employing the next axiom of the Nash solution.
(PAR) In the last expression (4) of the retaliatory disagreement point it can
be showed the impact of Home's export quota on the disagreement set. Ac-
cording Olson (1965) the there is less power of collusion in the large country so
that aF < aH : Therefore, zF > zH and the import quota of the large country
is not restrictive for the small country's exports since zFYF +t > zHYH   t:
This relationship is not a retaliatory stance in trade relations between two
asymmetric countries. Moreover, in equation (4) the small country may in-
crease its exports without changing the retaliatory stance of the large country
contradicting the Preto improving requirement of the Nash solution. It is
possible to expand exports increasing internal production till the price dier-
ential is eliminated. At limit, when t = 0 the countries are symmetric and the
retaliatory disagreement point is the one in expression (2).
[Figure 2 here]
(MARKET ASYMM) In Figure 2 the disagreement set of two asymmetric
countries is dierent from the set of two asymetric ones so that the symetric
property of the non-cooperative solution must be once again ensured for. Be-
cause of the induced asymmetry, we search those common disagreement points
complying with the Nash solution properties. For this we compare the set of
symmetric disagreement points with the asymmetric ones. In the equation (2)
and (4), the import quota of the Home country declines by t in the asymmet-
ric case as compared to the symmetry dH 00 < dH 0 so that we may consider the
asymmetric set of disagreement points dened by imports quotas included in
the symmetric set and dH 00 = (1/3)
 
zHYH   t

the Nash equilibrium solution
of the non-cooperative game. Using again Olson's (1965) result we establish
the inequality  zFYF  t <  zHYH for  > z
HY H
zFY H+t
and we retain the asym-
metric set of the disagreement points dF 00 = (1/3)
 
 zHYH   t

also dened
by import quotas as the Nash equilibrium solution of the non-cooperative game
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Figure 2. Retaliatory disagreement set
in the Foreign country. The symmetric retaliatory disagreement point is
(SRDP )
 
dH 00;dF 00

= (1/3)
 
zHYH   t; zFYF   t

for zHYH > t ;  >
zHY H
zFY H + t
(8)
Proposition 4. Asymmetries in the market size between two strategically in-
teracting trading partners reinforces the retaliatory stance between them.
Within equation (8), SRDP varies inversely related with t: A change in the
parameters dening production and consumption function will determine pro-
portional changes in both countries' prices therefore we can conclude that a
country cannot be made better o without worsening the retaliatory partner.
Increased openness of one country won't deter its strategic partner from tight-
ening the protectionist stance. The market size limit is a necessary condition
for SDRP to be Pareto improving and the change is less than proportional
when  2 (1;1) : In the gure 2 is depicted the Pareto frontier of D2:
Further we are concerned with the impact of the dierence in market size on
the retaliatory stance between countries. At rst glance we might be tempted
to conclude that increasing dierences in market size by varying the parameter
 pushes the trade equilibrium away from the retaliatory one and the large
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country may freely increase its openness without changing the other country's
retaliatory stance. However, such conclusion would violate the Pareto con-
straint of the Nash solution. The Pareto axiom is veried if we notice that
increasing dierences in market size determines a decease in price dierential
and production potential so that Pareto improving equilibrium changes. In
order to be maintained the market size increase has to be less than the price
dierential decrease and production potential loss. Suppose that 
00
is a higher
dierence in market size which determines a lower price dierential (pF
00
-pH
00)
which is the source of a lower production potential yF
00
and a higher one yH
00
then,
8><
>:
00    >
 
pF 00   pH 00

+
 
yF 00   yH 00

then IF 00 > IF ; IH 0 > IH
00    =
 
pF 00   pH 00

+
 
yF 00   yF 00

then IF 00 = IF ; IH 00 = IH
00    <
 
pF 00   pH 00

+
 
yF 00   yF 00

then IF 00 < IF ; IH 00 > IH 00
If the price and production eects do not exceed the rate of market size
increase the impact on the retaliatory stance in trade is not Pareto like and
countries may increase their trade openness. On the other side, using exports
as retaliatory stance implies the inequality zFYF + t < zHYH for zHYH <
t,  < z
HY H
zFY H+t
and we retain the symmetric set of the disagreement points
dF 00 = (1/3)
 
 zHYH

also dened by import quotas as the Nash equilibrium
solution of the non-cooperative game in the Foreign country. But a SDRP
with dF " dened in this way is not Pareto improving and this explains why
countries may both improve the retaliatory stance without being necessary
one to be worse o than before. In addition, the small country nd itself in a
better situation that the retaliatory stance for very small dierences in market
size,  2 (0; 1).
Consequently, increasing the market size by varying the parameter as the
European Union already proceeded through enlargement pushes the trade equi-
librium away from the retaliatory one. The question is, are there any limits
to enlargement? The answer is No. As long as the price dierential included
in t exists and can be eliminated through political pressure for lower protection
in the small country while the large country's exports expand, the dierence in
market size may be increased.3 In the next section we empirically show that
the above objective can be attained using enlargement negotiations as proxy
for the political pressure.
The analysis reveals that the trade policy space dened with import quota is
the only Nash equilibrium of the retaliatory game between an large exporting
country and a small importing one. From IH 2 T1; IF 2 T? then


IH ; IF

=
0 , IH = 0 or IF = 0: In other words, at least one country chooses autarky
as policy option. A market surplus may be benecial for retaliatory trade
if it is not associated with an important impact on prices and production
potential. Moreover, an export quota as retaliatory stance against a large
country import quota is a better outcome because it creates premises for better
market access. As long as the price dierential exists and can be eliminated
3The price dierential doesn't exist if pF = pH . Then t = 0 and  can be increased if a
F
aH
increases. If the price dierential doesn't exist anymore, the limits of enlargement are the
limits of the internal political pressure.
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through political pressure for lower protection in the small country while the
large country's exports expand, the retaliatory import quota of the small country
is not restrictive for the small country;s exports. Futhermore, if by Milner
(1988) the small country's exporters fear retaliation and the political pressure
for protection decreases allowing a better market access for the large country's
exports. Therefore, an import quota may increase at the same time with the
volume of export increase and the supposition in the introduction was wrong.
These ndings explain why EU's exports on Central East European markets
have not been associated with autarky in trade relations but with enlargement.
In the next section we explore the retaliatory potential in EU15-CEEC trade
relations based on the Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game. We
further show the impact of the dierence in the market size and of the varying
political pressure through negotiations on the retaliatory stance. We further
provide the empirical support to the claim that high volumes of exports are
not deterring cooperation in trade relations.
4. Empirical analysis
4.1 Data and methodology
In this paper we have determined the retaliatory disagreement point in the
space determined by the optimum import respectively export quotas or the
dierence between the national production and consumption potential. For-
mally, (
dH 00 = IH = (1=3)
 
zHYH   t

dF 0 = EF =  (1=3)
 
zFYH + t
 (9)
Substituting dF 0 in dH 00 through the mean of t, IF = (1=3) (zFY H +
zHY H   IF ) so that we have a formal expression for the retaliatory game.
In order to control the inuence of the production potential on the retaliatory
game we have divided both sides of the last expression by YH ,
IF
YH
= (1=3) (zF + zH  
IH
YH
)(10)
This is an equilibrium of the international trade which we estimate empiri-
cally with the following equation,
lnY = 0 + 1lnX1 + 2 lnX2 + 3lnX3 + 4lnX1 X3 + 5lnX2 X3
where the analysis of the dierence in market size and political negotiations
impact is related to the small country's retaliatory stance. The dependent
variable Y is the small country's import penetration ratio as compared to its
import dependence. The independent variable X1 is each on his turn the im-
port dependence respectively export dependence of the small country when we
control for the dierence in market size X2 and a dummy variable X3 for start-
ing the enlargement negotiations. The import penetration ration is dierent
from the traditional denition because the observed level of imports between
countries is replaced with the dierence between the internal production and
the internal consumption. The optimum trade ows as dierence between
production and consumption have been previously estimated empirically by
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Baldwin (1971) through the vector of adjusted net exports4 for the empirical
test of Heckscher-Ohlin model. In our model the vector of the optimal trade
ows is similar but the empirical estimate cannot be made using adjusted net
exports because in the data one country's imports are the other country's ex-
ports so that we cannot calculate the corresponding vector of adjusted net
exports for the opposing player in the strategic interaction. We then compute
the dierence between production and consumption for optimum export quota,
respectively imports minus exports for optimum import quota. In Fig. 3 we
plot the adjusted net exports of the small countries in the sample against the
optimum trade ows. The adjusted net exports representing the actual trade
balance for wine is lower than the optimum trade ows so that if the model is
veried empirically at the optimum, the actual lower volumes of net exports
were not retaliatory.
Figure 3. Actual versus optimum exports ('000000hl)
The dummy variable is used as a proxy for the parameter repersenting the
internal political pressure and we model it as a qualitative variable interacting
with each other variable dening the model. So that the rest of the variables
capture the eects of the interaction between the political option of being in-
volved in negotiations or not on the protectionist stance and the more complex
interaction with the dierence in market size.
We have collected data from the California Wine Institute for the European
Union's wine sector. Our data covers a period of eleven years between 1995
and 2005 for three countries (Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria) included in
international statistics as main wine producers on the world market and at
the same time trading partners for the EU-15, candidates to enlargement and
involved in negotiations for trade liberalization.
This choice of the countries is one of the most appropriate because the 1995-
2005 time span includes variability in the internal political pressure for trade
4Adjusted net exports have been dened as industry exports minus industry imports (Feen-
stra (2002)).
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No Country Average 2001-2003 No Country Average 2001-2003
('000hl) ('000hl)
1 France 50,034 11 Chile 5,988
2 Italy 46,994 12 Romania 5,269
3 Spain 35,274 13 Hungary 4,242
4 United States 24,249 14 Russia 4,007
5 Argentina 13,918 15 Greece 3,454
6 China 11,200 16 Brazil 2,933
7 Australia 10,683 17 Moldova 2,230
8 Germany 8,989 18 Austria 2,552
9 South Africa 7,504 19 Ukraine 2,197
10 Portugal 7,269 20 Bulgaria 2,185
Table 1. World hierarchy of wine producers, California Wine Institute
openness. The countries have started enlargement negotiations at dierent
points in time so that it should be possible to assess the impact of a lower
political pressure after the opening of negotiations.
The model suggests that a) an increase in one's player import quota doesn't
change the retaliatory stance of the opposing partner (-). Because of orthogo-
nally, the import quota is replaced by the export quota as dependent variable
and we expect the same slopes but the opposite sign. As the model also
suggests, b) the small country's import penetration ratio increases to permit
higher access for the large country's exports. (+)
Helen Milner (1988) has been extensively analyzed the linkage between the
internal protectionist pressures and the import penetration respectively export
dependence ratio. For the sample of data at hand, in Table 2 we show how
Milner's conclusions that higher global interdependence trigger more trade
openness may be applied for EU and Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary and
why we expect statistically signicant result for retaliation with exports being
a better outcome for international trade relations.
In 1995, ve years after the collapse of the communist regime in Central
East European countries, the economic reminiscences of the autarkic stance in
trade are still obvious. In the economic literature there is a broad consensus
regarding the isolationist economic stance which has been a characteristic for
the CEEC's economies during '80 and early '90. The data in the Table 2
gives us important information of what actually isolation meant. That is a) a
high export dependence rate for all Eastern European countries in the sample
and b) very low import penetration ratio for EU exports. We notice high
rates of wine exports nding market access on European market. Moreover,
there is an obvious imbalance between the volumes of exports which have far
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Import penetration Export dependence
1996 2005 1996 2005
Romania 3 4 53 22
EU-15 3 1 0.08 0.1
1996 2005 1996 2005
Bulgaria 0.4 4 300 42
EU-15 6 1 0.002 0.04
1995 2005 1995 2005
Hungary 5 29 103 68
EU-15 0.08 2 3 0.5
SOURCE: Author's calculations using UN Comtrade data
Table 2. 'Resisting protectionism' in Central East European
Countries, 1995-2005
exceeded the national optimum exports while the imports penetration ratios
are very close to the level we have dened as being retaliatory. In 1995, we
calculated the retaliatory rates as being 4 in Romania, 22 in Bulgaria and 8
in Hungary. The import penetration ratios were all lower than the retaliatory
rates. From the European Unions side has been applied an import quota of
300,000 hectoliters representing an import penetration ratio of 2.45 which is
even less than the 12 percentage points the retaliatory rate. We conclude
that in 1995 trade relations between Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary and EU
were retaliatory. Agricultural negotiations have been opened with Hungary
in 2000 and Romania and Bulgaria in 2002. In 2005, the retaliatory rates
were 2 in Romania, 19 in Bulgaria and 5 in Hungary. The import penetration
ratios were higher than the retaliatory rates except for Bulgaria. But in 2004,
liberalization was achieved with all three countries in the sample. Not less
important is the lack of imbalance between the import penetration ratios and
export dependence ones. At optimum, they should be approximately equal and
higher than the retaliatory rates. Table 2 depicts the most balanced situation
for Hungary in 2005. Indeed, Hungary became a member of the European
Union since May 2004.
4.2 Results and discussion
We have shown that the data sample ts our model and we start the empir-
ical test using the ordinary least squares estimation technique with panel data
in STATA. The data has been scaled to measure the small country production
in 300,000 hl respectively 3,000,000 hl for the large country's production. The
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dummy variable has been constructed assigning a 0 value for the periods when
the countries were not involved in enlargement negotiations over the Agricul-
tural Chapter and 1 starting with the year when the Agricultural Chapter has
been opened for negotiation. One particular case is the one of Hungary who
closed all negotiations in 2004 when it became a full member of the Euro-
pean Union so that we perform a sensitivity analysis estimating the model as
if Hungary would still negotiate in 2004 and 2005 versus unbalanced panels
with missing dummy variable for Hungary in the same period. The data is
transformed into logarithms to ensure normality and hetroskedasticity. The
plot of the natural logarithm of the large country's import quota against time
indicates the existence of an outlier for Bulgaria in 1999 so that we reesti-
mate the model excluding the outlier. Before proceeding with the analysis,
the Hausman test for the suitability of xed eects versus random eects for
model estimation is performed. We obtain a very small Hausman statistic so
that we proceed with the random eects model. In Model 1 we estimate the
model using import quotas. In Model 2 we include export dependence ratio as
independent variable to show orthogonality.
Model 1 Model 2
Constant 0.172*** 0.172***
(0.023) (0.023)
Log Small country's import quota -0.565* 0.583*
(0.316) (0.324)
Log dierence in market size -0.058*** -0.058***
(0.006) (0.006)
A dummy for enlargement negotiations -0.081** -0.081***
(0.037) (0.037)
Log Small country's import quota*negotiations 0.759* 0.771*
(0.470) (0.473)
Log dierence market size*negotiations 0.024*** 0.024***
(0.010) (0.010)
Observations 33 33
R2 0.80 0.81
*p 0:10;   p  0:05;   p  0:01
Table 3. Empirical estimation of the retaliatory game
We have obtained the expected signs for the correlations. Indeed, under
retaliation the increase of the large country quota won't deter the small coun-
try from tightening its retaliatory import quota so that at least one country
chooses autarky. To further understand why this result was possible consider
that the large country accepts a lower volume of exports instead of the small
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country's exports and increases its import quota. But the small country choses
to expand its exports by setting an import quota to protect its infant industry
for example. The countries choose opposite stances and trade liberalization is
not possible. On the contrary, expanding exports on competitive groundsin-
creases the large country's increases trade openness beneting the global trade.
As expected being involved in negotiations increases access to the large coun-
try's market. The interaction between the small country's import penetration
ratio and the probability of being involved in negotiations is very interesting
because it assigns a 0 value to the small country's import quota when there
are not negotiations versus the politically minimum import quota when there
are trade liberalization negotiations. We have obtained a positive statistically
signicant coecient which indicates that negotiations make a dierence in re-
taliatory trade relations by moving them away from autarky at least towards
the Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game.
Political negotiations make a positive dierence also in the case of the market
size impact. For the European wine market the increasing surplus it can
be associated with a higher order magnitude impact on internal price and
production volumes suggesting a retaliatory type of market increase of the
large country. However political negotiations for lower political pressure for
exporting changes the impact of the market size from a retaliatory one into a
positive development.
Next, we are concerned with the time impact in our cross-sectional data.
Our estimates of the equation (11) reects a simultaneous moves game for
choosing the protectionist trade policy. In Model 3 we test this assumption
also including a lagged value of the small country's retaliatory import quota.
Time and delays might still be a concern for production because import quotas
are established yearly based on the previous year production potential and the
next year's forecast. Model 4 estimates the retaliatory equation including a
lagged value of the dierence in market potential as regressor. In Model 5
we include the squared regressor for the small country's retaliatory imports to
check the linearity in the model.
As expected, we have found a negative statistically not signicant value
for the lagged value of the current period import quota of the small country
reinforcing our assumption of a simultaneous moves game. The retaliatory
game is overall signicantly inuenced by the change in the dierence in market
size between countries. Taking into consideration the past and present values of
the market size dierence improves the statistical signicance of the retaliatory
import quota at 5 percent while the linearity of the model is also veried.
Treer (1993) estimated the endogenous protection for US using data on
non tari barriers from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) and an extensive list of regressors to capture the free-rider problem
of the lobby coordination. A likelihood ratio test shows that the comparative
advantage regressors given by the import penetration ratio, the change in
import penetration of the following year as compared with the previous and
exports are the most signicant in the regression. There is not a statistically
signicant parameter for the import penetration ratio but for the change in
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Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Constant 0.180*** 0.195*** 0.198***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
Log Small country's import quota -0.537 -0.857*** -1.741**
(0.336) (0.341) (0.757)
Log dierence market size -0.061*** -0.053*** -0.055***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
A dummy for enlargement negotiations -0.083** -0.087*** -0.095***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.034)
Log Small country's import quota*negotiations 0.794* 0.786 1.132**
(0.444) (0.437) (0.509)
Log dierence market size*negotiations 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.029***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Lagged value of Small country's import quota -0.210
(0.348)
Lagged value of Log dierence market size -0.012 -0.012
(0.008) (0.008)
Squared value Log Small country's imports -32.366
(24.845)
Observations 30 30 30
R2 0.84 0.86 0.87
*p 0:10;   p  0:05;   p  0:01
Table 4. Time changes in the retaliatory game
import penetration over the subsequent years. We are again concerned with
the robustness of our results at 'time impact' so that as in Treer (1993) we
estimate the change of the large country's import quota against a yearly change
in the protectionist stance of the small country. We create a new regressor to
estimate the 1 percent change in the large country's protectionist stance given
1 percentage change in the small country's politically minimum import quota.
We estimate the model including the change in Model 6. Similar to Treer
(1993) and in accord with our simultaneous moves game assumption, we show
that the results are robust to a change in the method of estimation. In model
7 we use simultaneous equations method.
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Model 6 Model 7
Constant 0.196*** 0.172***
(0.028) (0.020)
Log Small country's import quota -0.882** -0.565**
(0.388) (0.286)
Log dierence market size -0.066*** -0.058***
(0.008) (0.006)
A dummy for enlargement negotiations -0.088*** -0.081**
(0 .035) (0.034)
Log Small country's import quota*negotiations 0.758* 0.759*
(0.438) (0.425)
Log dierence market size*negotiations 0.026*** 0.024***
(0.009) (0.009)
Yearly change in the Small country's import quota 0.052
(0.363)
Yearly change in log inverse production 0.011
(0.008)
Lagged value of Small country's import quota dropped
Lagged value of Log inverse production dropped
Observations 30 30
R2 0.86 0.80
*p 0:10;   p  0:05;   p  0:01
Table 5. Treer's change in import penetration and the rela-
tion with the retaliatory game
Unlike Treer (1993) we did not nd a statistically signicant coecient for
the change in the import penetration. Our estimated results are robust to any
change in time and simultaneous equations estimation reinforces the previous
analysis. We have found an orthogonal relationship between the lagged values
of the protectionist stances in trade and production potential and the yearly
changes. Neither of them is statistically signicant.
Finally, the already mentioned sensitivity analysis with unbalanced panels
and sensitivity to outliers is performed in Model 9 respectively Model 10.
We have found strong evidence that the retaliatory stance in trade is inu-
ence by the size of the countries in negative sense. The sign of the coecient
dening the retaliatory protectionist stance of the opposing partner is the
one suggested by the model however its statistical signicance is sensitive to
changes in the data sample. One limitation of the estimation is the small sam-
ple size so that we cannot proceed with a more extensive analysis of sample
variations.
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Model 8 Model 9
Constant 0.172*** -0.114***
(0.023) (0.022)
Log Small country's import quota -0.565* -0.222
(0.322) (0.260)
Log dierence market size -0.058*** -0.040***
(0.006) (0.006)
A dummy for enlargement negotiations - 0.085** -0.023
(0.041) (0.032)
Log Small country's import quota*negotiations 0.822 0.417
(0.537) (0.377)
Log dierence market size*negotiations 0.025** 0.006
(0.011) (0.009)
Observations 30 27
R2 0.80 0.77
*p 0:10;   p  0:05;   p  0:01
Table 6. Sensitivity analysis of the retaliatory game
5. Conclusion
We have shown that a retaliatory policy space dened with 'import-export'
quotas is not a Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game. The vector
space model facilitates a very useful representation of the strategic interaction
in trade because it is possible to incorporate both symmetric and asymmetric
features of the players. In our model the outcome of the non-cooperative trade
game is autarky but despite our autarky result of retaliation we would advise
cautiousness in making it general. The result is dependent on the orthog-
onality of the vector space which denes international trade. An extension
of the paper is to reconsider retaliation in an extended vector space by re-
moving orthogonality. Our results throw a shed of light on retaliation in trade
relations. For policy making, the model is important because it specically de-
termines how much should be restricted the volume of imports for retaliation
to start, namely 1/3 from the politically minimum acceptable quotas. Exports
being a better outcome of the retaliatory game explains why EU15-CEEC lib-
eralization has been possible despite the expansionist volumes of exports on
both sides. Increasing dierence in the market size reinforces the protectionist
stance while international negotiations benet trade.
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